SB 1357, An Act Concerning The Department Of Consumer Protection’s Recommendations Regarding Various Statutes Concerning Consumer Protection

TESTIMONY OF THE CONNECTICUT HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GENERAL LAW COMMITTEE

Wednesday, February 26, 2025

The Connecticut Hospital Association (CHA) appreciates this opportunity to submit testimony concerning SB 1357, An Act Concerning The Department Of Consumer Protection’s Recommendations Regarding Various Statutes Concerning Consumer Protection. CHA has concerns regarding Sections 36 and 37 of the bill.

Connecticut hospitals and health systems care for patients, strengthen the state’s economy, and support vulnerable communities across the state. Every day, they work to improve healthcare access, affordability, and health equity. Even as they face ongoing challenges, hospitals provide world-class care to everyone who walks through their doors, regardless of their ability to pay. Hospitals also support an exemplary workforce as the largest collective employer in the state, contribute significantly to the state’s economy, and invest in their communities addressing social drivers of health.

In 2021, Connecticut passed PA 21-60, Section 1 (later codified at Section 21a-434 of the general statutes), as a consumer protection law. The law was primarily copied from a similar law in New Jersey and serves the goal of ensuring that people paying with cash would not be disadvantaged in retail transactions. According to survey data the FDIC released in November 2023, in Connecticut, 2.9% of residents do not have a bank account – which means reasonable pathways are needed that allow them to pay in cash.

Section 36 of SB 1357 seeks to update Section 21a-434 to allow pre-paid cards, purchased with cash, to be used for purchases, for example, at a cashless retail location or an automated retail machine. That is a sensible mechanism to have in place that balances the goal of the law with the realities of technologies and business operations. CHA supports these changes.

CHA urges additional clarity:

  • To include that a mechanism that allows a person to pay in cash at a central or assigned location also meets the law. There are myriad instances where it is not feasible to accept cash – including sometimes large amounts of cash – at the point of service
  • To recognize that the definition of “retail” as used in Section 21a-434 does not apply to professional services that do not offer retail goods. The current definition in 21a-434 applies the restrictions to retail locations – stating that “at retail includes any retail transaction conducted in person… .” It is not consistent with common language interpretations that “retail” or “retail transaction” would include professional services such as visits to a doctor’s office. This is based on core statutory construction principles as set forth in Section 1-1 of the General Statutes that indicate common usage of language are generally applied when reading laws, and Section 1-2z of the General Statutes – the plain meaning rule. Rules of statutory construction are designed to ensure clarity. Those rules do not allow the plain meaning and common usage of a word (in this case the word “retail”) to be re-interpreted by an agency to have a different meaning

Section 37 of SB 1357, at lines 1916-1938, appears to give the Department of Consumer Protection (DCP) extraordinary emergency powers which are not consistent with normal administrative law principles. The new language allows DCP to take plenary action without providing customary hearings, notices, or other administrative requirements when there is an issue potentially involving unfair trade practices. Yet, the language does not specify over which individuals, entities or businesses such powers would be allowed to be used. Section 37 of the bill would allow, for example, DCP to take action against the license of a registered nurse even though the Department of Public Health and nursing board are the correct entities empowered to regulate those with a nursing license.

The recent pandemic brought into sharp relief the need for the legislature to be precise with any delegation of legislative powers to agencies when an agency would be given power to skip or shortcut well-established rights and processes in place to ensure due process and constitutional controls are observed. It is not evident that the language in lines 1916-1938 of SB 1357 meets that rigorous standard. At a minimum, the types of entities against whom DCP may take these extraordinary actions, the role of other agencies, and the thresholds and bases for DCP plenary actions as they relate to unfair trade practices need to be much clearer.

Thank you for your consideration of our position. For additional information, contact CHA Government Relations at (203) 294-7301.